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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2A-3(2)(j)(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Nielsen agrees with the "Statement of Issue Presented" in
Colbys' brief.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-3 (1995) which states as follows:
Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any
interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in
writing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Colbys leased commercial premises from Nielsen.

Nielsen

filed suit against the Colbys in May 1996 seeking termination of
the tenancy and restitution of the premises.

Nielsen presented a

written lease to Colby in October, 1995 and directed him to:
1) sign the lease; 2) have his wife sign the lease; 3) get each
signature notarized, and 4) return the signed lease to Nielsen.
(Record 239)
In conjunction with Nielsen's Complaint, an Order to Show
Cause was issued, asking the Court to rule that no written lease
was in force between the parties. A hearing was held on June 17,
1996.

At that time, the district court took proffers of evidence

which were stipulated to by counsel (Record 192, 196). The Court
found that the lease had never been signed by the Colbys and

Colbys were in arrears on the rent payments.
judgment to be entered.

(Record 205).

The Court directed

An "Order and Judgment of

Restitution" was entered on July 1, 1996.

(see Exhibit 1 of

Appellants' brief).
The Colbys next filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for
Stay of Execution, which included affidavits disputing the number
of checks which failed to clear the bank, and also claiming that
Mr. Colby signed the lease the day it was presented to him.

(No

claim has ever been presented asserting that Mrs. Colby signed
the lease before the eviction order was served on Colbys or that
signatures were notarized, or that the lease was returned to
Nielsen).

The district court denied this motion (Record 216),

finding that all conditions precedent and necessary for
acceptance were not met.
The Colbys then retained new counsel, and filed a Motion for
Relief from Judgment or in the Alternative, for Stay Pending
Appeal with additional affidavits.

(Record 046-083).

This

motion was denied by the district court after hearing on July 29,
1996. (Record 243).

However, the court granted the Colbys7

motion to stay the effect of its ruling, leaving the Colbys in
possession, and this appeal followed.

The Colbys are still in

possession at the present date.
STATEMENT OP PACTS
Darrell Nielsen (Nielsen) owns commercial real estate with a
street address of 761 West 12th Street, Ogden, Utah 84404.
defendants, Carl Colby and Marie Colby, his wife, dba Super
2

The

Savers Store, occupied the premises on a month-to-month rental
basis prior to October of 1995.

(R. 001, 037)

In October 1995, the plaintiff presented a lease agreement
to the defendants and stated that if they wanted to continue to
occupy the premises, they would have to enter into the lease
agreement.

(Record 002, 037, 193). In early October 1995,

Nielsen and Carl Colby met.

Nielsen told Colby that he would

have to sign the two copies of the lease agreement, have his wife
sign the lease, have them notarized and return them to Nielsen,
to have the lease become valid.

(Record 193).

Mrs. Colby failed to sign the lease (Record

193, 038),

failed to have their signatures notarized, and failed to return
the lease agreements to Nielsen.

In the ensuing months, the

lease agreements were never returned and Nielsen made several
phone calls to Colbys to have them sign the agreements and return
them.

(Record 193). On most occasions, Colby tried to put

Nielsen off and said that he had not signed them, or had not yet
had his wife sign them, and they had not yet been notarized.
(Record 193, 194)
Thereafter, several payments made by Colby to Nielsen failed
to clear the bank and were returned to Nielsen for insufficient
funds.

(Record. 192-195).

Nielsen made continual efforts to contact Colbys to apprise
them that they needed to sign the lease agreement, and that the
checks had to come in a timely manner.

(Record 194).

On June 17, 1996 a hearing was held before Judge Stanton M.
3

Taylor; the facts were stipulated to the court, including the
fact that Mr. Colby never signed the lease agreement, never had
his wife sign it, and did not have it notarized, and never
returned the lease to Nielsen (Record 196, 239). Additionally,
Mr. Colby's attorney stipulated that at the date of the hearing,
several checks had been unpaid on their rent.

On the record, the

court asked the defendant's attorney why Colby hadn't signed the
lease agreement and delivered it to Nielsen.

(Record 203).

Mr. Medsker: "He said he saw no reason. Just didn't
get around to it. Wasn't — he felt that he was in
there lawfully. He felt that the lease would continue.
He wanted to stay. He just said he never got around to
signing it. He signed it the day he brought it into
our office and — which would have been shortly after
he was served with this. I don't know that he has any
excuse for not signing it. He just didn't." 1
Based upon the evidence before the court, on June 17, 1996 the
court ruled that the lease was withdrawn by the March 28 eviction
letter, which constituted a withdrawal of the offer to enter into
the lease.

(Record 203).

The Colbys were in a month-to-month

tenancy, that a proper eviction notice had been served, and the
defendants were to vacate the premises. (Record 204).

The

defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration and filed
affidavits in connection therewith, and then Mr. Colby said that
he signed one copy of the lease on the date he and Mr. Nielsen
In defendants' answer which has never been amended,
defendants also state:
"Defendants acknowledge that the lease agreement was
not executed by them until the purported eviction
notice was given to them, but that the said lease
agreement was executed by plaintiff and acknowledged to
be in force by defendants." (Record 013)
4

met in early October, 1995.

(Record 019). Mr. Colby was told to

take the lease, have his wife sign it and get it notarized and
return it to Nielsen.

(Record 239).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Colbys never accepted the lease.

Under the best facts, they

don't dispute that Mrs. Colby never signed the lease (until she
did so in her attorney's office) and the lease was never
notarized or returned to Mr. Nielsen.
late in making payments.

Colbys were habitually

The trial court was correct in ruling

that no written lease existed, and since it was a month-to-month
tenancy, Mr. Nielsen could terminate the tenancy.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT MR. COLBY NEVER ACCEPTED THE
CONTRACT IN QUESTION.
Mr. Nielsen drew up a lease agreement and expressly
specified the manner in which it was to be accepted.

He directly

stated face-to-face with Mr. Colby that the lease was to be
signed by him, and by his wife.

He further stated that it should

be notarized and returned to him.

Mr. Colby agreed that these

were the conditions that were spoken by Mr. Nielsen to him.
(Record 239). He further agreed that he did not carry out these
conditions precedent.

The District Court, as a matter of law,

interpreted the contract to contain conditions precedent.

Morris

v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199,
1200 (Utah, 1983).
5

Basic contract law declares that when an offer specifies the
manner in which it must be accepted, it can only be accepted in
that specific manner.

Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co.,

v. Ross. 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993).
precedent are those that must occur or be performed
contract takes effect and is enforceable.

Conditions
before

Arnold v. S.J.L. of

Kansas Corp.. 822 P.2d 64, 67 (Kansas, 1991); Medical Services
Group. Inc., v. Boise Lodge No. 310, 878 P.2d 789, 793 (Id. Ct.
App. 1994).
The case cited by defendants on the position that only one
signature would make a lease enforceable against the signer is
not applicable in this case.

In Commercial Union Associates v.

Clayton. 863 P.2d 29, 36-37 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) it was the
lessees who sought to avoid the lease, and claimed that the
corporate entity had never signed the lease and therefore it was
not binding.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court recited 18

separate Findings by the trial court, showing the parties acted
as if their lease was signed.
There are substantial factual differences in this matter.
(a)

Mr. Colby had been operating under a month-to-

month lease for over six (6) years before he asked for a
lease agreement.

Several rent increases were agreed to,

paid, and received during those six (6) years.
(b)

Colby had requested a Lease Agreement, which was

presented to him for signing, and the parties clearly agreed
on a rental amount.

Neither party materially changed their

6

position in reliance upon a lease being entered as was done
in the Commercial Union case, and the parties operated on a
month-to-month tenancy as they had previously done.
(c) No material or substantial alterations of the
building were made, and no reliance was made that a lease
was in effect.
Basic contract law provides that when an offer is made and
not accepted, then the contract is not valid.

Mr. Colby did not

return the lease in a timely manner. Mr. Nielsen revoked the
lease and therefore no lease existed.
The signing of the lease by Mr. and Mrs. Colby before a
notary public was a condition precedent to the contract.

By his

own affidavit, Mr. Colby admits he was to have the lease signed
by his wife and notarized and returned to Nielsen. (Record 239).
This constitutes a "condition precedent" to having a valid lease.
Utah Courts recognize conditions precedent.

see Commercial Union

Associates v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29 (Utah App. 1993) at 38.
The failure to have the lease signed by Colby and his wife
notarized, and returned makes the lease invalid.
The Court of Appeals of Utah noted that for an offeree's
response to constitute acceptance, the offeree must manifest a
definite intention to accept the offer and every
part thereof, without material reservations or conditions."

Cal

Wadsworth Construction v. St. George. 865 P.2d 1373, 1376 (Ut.
Ct. App. 1993).

Colby's actions show no sign of accepting the

offer according to the conditions precedent.
7

Colby's wife never

signed the contract.

The contract was never notarized or

returned to Mr. Nielsen.

(Record 239)

The defendant incorrectly argues that the acceptance of the
rental payments constituted acceptance of the lease, and
therefore a contract was created.

As stated above, a contract

cannot be accepted in any other way than specified by the
expressed terms of the offeror.

Equitable Life & Casualty

Insurance Co.. v. Ross. 849 P.2d at 1992.

In the history of the

rental of the building to the defendant, the monthly rental was
raised several times without an official written lease.
069).

(Record

Mr. Nielsen raised the monthly rent several times without

an official written lease.

(Record 069).

Mr. Nielsen tried

several times to get Mr. Colby to carry out the conditions of the
lease.

Mr. Colby knew of the conditions and consistently made

excuses for not following through with them.

Neither party acted

in a manner that would constitute acceptance to the written
contract.
The defendant argues that Mr. Nielsen is estopped from
denying the validity of the written lease.

The law of equitable

estoppel is "conduct by one party which leads another party, in
reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in
detriment or damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate
his conduct."

Crismon v. Western Co. of North America. 742 P.2d

1219, 1222 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The defendant seems to suggest that Nielsen's conduct leads
the defendant to rely on the contract.
8

A careful examination of

the evidence seems to suggest exactly the opposite.

Mr. Nielsen

repeatedly attempted to contact Mr. Colby in order to retrieve a
signed copy of the lease.

He made many phone calls to Mr. Colby

demanding the completion of the expressed terms of acceptance.
He made several trips to the store of Mr. Colby to retrieve the
lease in question.

These facts show that Mr. Nielsen made it

very clear to Mr. Colby that the lease had not been completed
because Mr. Colby had never accepted the offer and returned the
lease in accordance to the expressed conditions.
Mr. Nielsen is under no obligation to follow a lease that
was not accepted by the expressed conditions precedent.

Medical

Services Group, Inc. v. Boise Lodge No. 310. 878 P.2d at 793.
His revocation of the offer terminated any consideration between
the two parties.

Estoppel does not apply when conditions

precedent were not met by the party trying to enforce the lease
at hand.

Mr. Nielsen's conduct clearly demonstrated that

performance of the conditions was necessary to create a binding
contract.
Mr. Colby did not want the burdens of the lease, but was
hoping to have all benefits of the lease, but the law will not
allow him to do so.
II.
SUMMARY EVICTION WAS PROPER BECAUSE THE
LACK OF A CONTRACT CREATED A MONTH-TO-MONTH
TENANCY.
The court correctly concluded that a month-to-month tenancy
existed when Mr. Colby did not accept the contract.
9

The district court correctly followed rulings of the Utah
Supreme Court when it concluded that a month-to-month tenancy
existed when the contract was not accepted.

The Utah Supreme

Court stated that when "nothing more is shown than payment and
receipt of rent, the result at common law is a tenancy at will or
at most of one from year to year."

Evershed v. Berry, 436 P.2d

438, 440 (Utah, 1968).
When rent is paid on a monthly basis, the most appropriate
tenancy is a month-to-month tenancy.

The case at hand parallels

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake Citv v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112
(Ut. Ct. App. 1989).

The Utah Court of Appeals ruled that when

the tenants failed to timely renew their lease agreement, the
tenant's holding over of property did not create a new lease.
Instead, it resulted only in a month-to-month tenancy which
terminated when owners gave tenants written notice of their
intention to terminate the lease.

See also Schartz v. Foster,

805 P.2d 505, 506 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
The District Court correctly concluded that a month-to-month
tenancy was created, and that Mr. Nielsen legally delivered an
eviction notice to the Colbys based on the month-to-month
tenancy.
III.
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
JUDGMENT WHEN NO MATERIAL FACTS
WERE DISPUTED IN THIS CASE.
The district court correctly granted judgment when it ruled
that a contract had not been established.
10

"Judgment [should be]

granted when no genuine issue of material fact exists and moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

B & Assoc, v.

L.A. Sons Construction Co.. 796 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah, 1990).
In the case at hand, the material issues of the contract are
not in dispute.

Both the plaintiff and the defendant agree on

the material issues.

The defendant indicated that he would have

to have a lease agreement to continue the tenancy with the
defendants.

Nielsen presented a lease agreement and expressly

stated that both Colby and his wife sign the agreement, that it
be notarized, and that it be given back to Nielsen.

Colby freely

admitted that Nielsen directly advised him of these expressed
conditions while handing him the lease.

(Record 239).

Both

sides further agree that Colby's wife never signed the contract
(until after the eviction notice was served) and that it was
never notarized and returned to Mr. Nielsen.

The plaintiff

revoked his offer for the lease by personally delivering to the
defendants an eviction notice on March 28, 1996.

These

undisputed facts directly support the judgment of the district
court.
IV.
EVEN ASSUMING THE FACTS OF THE DEFENDANT
TO BE TRUE, THE DEFENDANT STILL COULD NOT
PREVAIL IN THIS CASE.
In order for judgment to be granted, the court must construe
the information and facts in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the judgment.

Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Insurance

Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah, 1986).
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The case at hand directly

conforms to these regulations.

Accepting the facts according to

the defendant, there is still no issue of fact as to whether
Colby properly accepted the offer.

The defendant admits that Mr.

Nielsen expressly stated the conditions precedent of the offer to
him.

Also, the defendant freely admits that he never notarized

the document.

The defendant also admits that his wife never

signed the document in question until after Nielsen withdraw his
offer.

Accepting all his other facts as true, Mr. Colby never

carried out the conditions precedent which would bind Mr. Nielsen
to the contract.
The defense tries to argue that there are many factual
disputes in this case which exclude the use of summary
disposition.

The important distinction is that the factual

disputes must be material to the outcome at hand.

The Supreme

Court of Utah has stated that "the mere existence of some factual
disputes does not preclude the entry of summary judgment if those
issues are immaterial to resolution of the case."

Horaan v.

Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah, 1982).

The

facts here in question do not effect the outcome of the contract.
The District Court analyzed the contested facts in this case and
still concluded that the disputed facts did not effect the
resolution of the case and would not change the fact that a
contract had never been formed.

(Record 239)

12

CONCLUSION
The District Court correctly concluded that Mr. Colby never
completed the conditions precedent to the contract and that a
contract was never formed.

The court was correct to conclude

that no question of material fact existed in this case.

Judgment

was correctly granted in favor of Mr. Nielsen.
DATED this

\ ^

day of April, 1997.
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